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Abstract
While Indias state-owned enterprises are widely believed to be inefficient,
there is a dearth of studies that document such inefficiency on any rigorous ba-
sis. Yet, since improvement in firm efficiency is one of the basic objectives of
privatization, it is important to assess whether efficiency is indeed lower in the
public sector than in the private sector.
This paper compares the performance of state-owned enterprises with those of
private sector firms in respect of technical efficiency. The comparison is made in
eight different sectors over the period 1991-92 to 1998-99. We measure technical
efficiency using the method of Data Envelopment Analysis. Judging by the aver-
age levels of technical efficiency, no conclusive evidence of superior performance
on the part of the private sector is found.
Technical Efficiency in Public and Private Sectors in India: 
Evidence from the Post-Reform Years 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
India’s economic reforms launched in 1991 and continued over the years that followed 
have primarily been directed towards downsizing, although not dismantling, the ungainly 
public sector that is in many ways seen as a hindrance to efficient utilization of resources. 
There is a popular conviction that the private sector is more efficient and the problems 
faced by the public sector enterprises will be easily eliminated by the competitive market 
forces once these firms are privatized. Needless to say, the wisdom of the reform process 
has been challenged by the political Left primarily on polemical grounds. There has been 
surprisingly very little effort, however, at documenting the comparative performances of 
the public and private sectors with any degree of rigor, least of all in the most recent 
period. 
 
Instead, there is a presumption, based on theory as well as on empirical studies carried 
out in other contexts, that the private sector will deliver better performance and hence 
privatization is desirable. As a result, in policy-making circles, privatization has to be 
viewed as an essential concomitant of the ambitious program of economic reforms 
introduced since 1991that include macro-economic stabilization as well as structural 
reforms embracing industry, the external sector, the financial sector and agriculture. 
 
Yet, in formulating a policy of privatisation, it is important to know whether efficiency in 
the public sector is indeed lower than that in the private sector and whether this holds 
uniformly for the many sectors in which public sector enterprises operate. If this is not 
the case, then, privatization policy ought to focus on sectors in which the public 
enterprises have tended to under-perform. Such a result would also imply that public 
policy must address institutional factors – such as weak law enforcement, poor corporate 
governance and tardy bankruptcy procedures- that keep the private sector from realizing 
its fullest potential before embarking on full-blooded privatization. 
 
In India, the public sector is present in a whole range of manufacturing sectors- 
chemicals, electronics, metals, electrical and non-electrical machinery, textiles, transport 
equipment, minerals etc- and also in services such as telecommunications and airlines. In 
basic metals and machinery, its share of output is around 25 per cent, while in chemicals 
and transport equipment, its share is 15-20 per cent. In areas such as energy and non-
ferrous metals, its share was until recently close to 100 per cent. Given that the public 
sector in India is so ubiquitous, it is of great importance that the assets in the public sector 
today need be utilized efficiently,.  Estimating the relative efficiency of the public and 
private sectors is, therefore, of considerable relevance to the ongoing debate on 
privatization in India. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the literature 
on comparative performance of public and private sectors and the impact of privatization. 
Section 3 provides a brief description of the nonparametric method of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) employed in this paper. The empirical analysis is presented in section 4.  
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our results and their implications for policy. 
 
 
2. Review of relevant literature 
 
            A vast literature has grown on the relative performance of the public and private sectors 
and the impact of privatization. Among the better-known studies, Boardman and Vining 
(1989) compared performance measures for 500 non-US international firms and 
concluded that private sector performance was superior. However, other studies, such as 
Caves and Christensen (1980) and Fare, Grosskopf, and Logan (1985) have found 
evidence of superior performance by public sector firms. Martin and Parker (1997) 
review a number of other international studies that compared state and private sector 
enterprises and find that the evidence is mixed.  
 
            On privatization, there is the oft-cited study of Megginson et al (1994). They compared 
the pre- and post- privatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies 
from 18 countries and 32 industries during the period 1961 to 1990 and found 
improvements in various parameters of performance after privatization. Frydman et al 
(1999) find improvements in the performance of the 218 firms in the transition 
economies, although they emphasize that the improvement is contingent on getting the 
design of privatization right. LaPorta and Lopez-De-Silanes (1998) document similar 
improvements following privatization in Mexico. 
 
However, there is an impressive body of literature now that casts doubts on whether 
privatization yields such improvements in general in less developed countries. Nellis 
(2000), after reviewing some of the literature, observes that “the further east one travels, 
the less likely is one to see rapid or dramatic returns to privatization”. Others, such as 
Stiglitz (1998) have suggested the emphasis on privatization in some of the less 
developed economies might be misplaced. Stiglitz points out that the Chinese experience 
shows that “.. an economy might achieve more effective growth by focusing first on 
competition, leaving privatization until later.” 
 
More pertinently, perhaps, there is now growing recognition that in the absence of 
institutional and regulatory capacity- such as law enforcement, strong corporate 
governance, efficient capital markets- superior private sector performance cannot be 
taken for granted. A comparison of the relative efficiency and public and private 
enterprises in an emerging market such as India, should, therefore, merit attention. 
 
On India, the literature on comparative performance of the public and private sectors is 
rather scanty, especially in relation to the most recent period.  Bhaya (1990) compared 
performance over the period 1981-82 to 1985-86 by examining data published in the 
government’s Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). He looked at fixed capital, working 
capital and inventory in relation to net value added, as also gross output and net value 
added per employee and found no difference, although the private sector did better in 
terms of return on investment.   
 
Ahluwalia (1995) cites a study by the Institute of Public Enterprises that compared the 
performance of 221 central public enterprises with that of 541 large companies in the 
private sector for the three years from 1983-84 to 1985-86. The average gross return on 
capital employed was found to be 13.9 per cent in the private sector and 12.3 per cent in 
the public sector. When petroleum enterprises were excluded from the public sector, the 
return for the public sector fell to 8 per cent.  
 
Two studies that are most directly relevant to the present paper are by Ahuja and 
Majumdar (1998) and Majumdar(1999) that have analyzed the performance of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in India, using DEA methods.  
 
Ahuja and Majumdar (1998) examined the performance of 68 SOEs during the period 
1987 to 1991. These enterprises were all drawn from the manufacturing sector and the 
relevant data were obtained from the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). 
The authors used net value added to measure output and the number of employees and 
fixed assets (gross as well as net) as measures of the labor and capital inputs, 
respectively. They used nominal as well as deflated values of gross and net fixed assets, 
using the whole price index for manufacturing as deflator. They obtained annual average 
values of mean efficiency in the range of 0.35- 0.39. They suggested that the low values 
of efficiency pointed to substantial scope for improvement through measures such as 
privatization.  
 
There are several limitations to their study. First, as the authors acknowledge, they 
essentially compare efficiency of SOEs only relative to each other. For the study to be 
more meaningful, it is important to include a panel of private sector firms as well in the 
sample. Second, technical efficiency is measured across a highly heterogeneous sample 
of firms drawn from varied sectors and thus incorporating differing technologies. 
Technical efficiency comparisons are more meaningful when there is at least a modest 
degree of homogeneity in the firms being compared.  
 
Yet another limitation is that it is based on a small sample, considering that there are over 
200 firms owned by the central government alone (and, as mentioned, the authors 
examine only 68) and it leaves out sectors in industry other than manufacturing.  
 
In a subsequent paper, Majumdar (1999) attempts a broader evaluation. He compares 
performance across four categories: central government SOEs, SOEs owned by state 
governments (India is a federation of states), enterprises jointly owned by the government 
and the private sector and private sector enterprises. The comparison is based on 
aggregate data obtained from the Annual Survey of Industries and covers the period of 
1973-74 to 1988-89. In other words, there are four data points for each year and a total of 
16 years. Output is defined again as net value added and inputs are staff employed and 
deflated values of book values of capital.  
 
The author estimates mean technical efficiency for the categories of ownership and 
subjects the results to a Wilcoxon test. There is no significant difference between the 
central government-owned and state government enterprises; the central government-
owned enterprises are less efficient than private enterprises and enterprises in the joint 
sector; and the joint sector is less efficient than the private sector. The results are not 
different over two sub-periods, 1973-1980 and 1981-88.  
 
Majumdar concludes that the private sector clearly emerges a superior performer 
although he acknowledges that that the aggregate results may hide differences in 
performance within industrial sectors. (It is worth mentioning that the author also found 
that over the second period, in which various reforms in the public sector had been 
initiated, the annual rate of growth of efficiency was higher in the public sector than in 
the mixed sector or the private sector).  
 
The problem of lumping together disparate industrial categories applies to this study as 
well. A more serious limitation is that technical efficiency is measured over a sixteen-
year period, that is, there is one efficient frontier posited for the entire period, which 
clearly ignores the effect of technical change over such a long timeframe. 
 
Our study attempts to address some of the limitations in the earlier DEA studies on 
efficiency in public and private sector firms that we discussed above.  First, unlike 
Majumadar (1999) we use firm-level rather than aggregate data. At the same time, unlike 
Ahuja and Majumdar (1998), we include both private and public sector firms in our 
sample.  
 
Second, the technical efficiency of any firm from any particular industry is judged against 
a production frontier constructed from observed input-output data for firms from that 
industry only. This controls for technological heterogeneity across industries and 
provides a more meaningful measure of efficiency. We compare performance of public 
and private firms separately in eight different industrial sectors instead of lumping 
together firms in disparate industrial sectors.  
 
Third, we use annual cross-section data from different industries for measurement of 
efficiency of firms in different years. This avoids confusing technical change with 
efficiency change over time. 
 
We compare public and private sector firms using technical efficiency which measures 
the actual output of a firm with the maximum output that is theoretically feasible. It can 
be measured by the ratio of its actual output to the maximum output producible from its 
observed input bundle defined by the frontier production function.  
 
While technical efficiency is only one of the factors determining financial performance- 
other factors would be allocative and scale efficiencies- a comparison of performance on 
technical efficiency is useful because it tells us whether public sector firms can get as 
much output out of a given input bundle as private firms. If this turns out to be true, then 
differences in performance could well be the result of factors, such as choice of product-
mix or inputs-over which managers in public sector firms have relatively less control.  
 
If technical efficiency in the public sector is comparable to that in the private sector, it 
would, to some extent, undermine conventional perceptions about managerial and worker 
motivation and performance- for instance, the view that managers and workers in the 
public sector are more given to shirking than their counterparts in the private sector 
because the former lack incentives and effective monitoring. 
 
 
3. Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
We use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure technical efficiency. In parametric 
models, one specifies an explicit functional form for the frontier and econometrically 
estimates the parameters using sample data for inputs and output. Hence the validity of 
the derived technical efficiency measures depends critically on the appropriateness of the 
functional form specified.  
 
In contrast, the method of DEA introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) 
(1978) and further generalized by Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (BCC) (1984) provides a 
nonparametric alternative to parametric frontier production function analysis.  
 
In DEA, one makes only a few fairly weak assumptions about the underlying production 
technology. In particular, no functional specification is necessary. Based on these 
assumptions a production frontier is empirically constructed using mathematical 
programming methods from observed input-output data of sample firms. Efficiency of 
firms is then measured in terms of how far they are from the frontier. 
 
Consider an industry producing a scalar output, y, from bundles of m inputs, 
x=(x1,x2,…,xm). Let (xj, yj)  be the observed input-output bundle of firm j (j= 1,2,…, n). 
The technology is defined by the production possibility set  
  T={( x, y ): y can be produced from x }. 
An input-output combination (x0, y0)  is feasible if and only if (x0, y0) ∈  T. 
We make the following assumptions about the technology: 
 
• All observed input-output combinations are feasible. Thus, (xj, yj) ∈  T (j = 1,2,…,n). 
• The production possibility set, T, is convex. Hence, if (x1, y1) ∈  T and (x2, y2) ∈T, 
then 
(λx1+(1-λ)x2, λy1+(1-λ)y2)∈T, 0≤λ 1≤ . 
In other words, weighted averages of feasible input-output combinations are also 
feasible. 
• Inputs are freely disposable. Hence, if (x0, y0)∈T and x1≥ x0, then (x1, y0)∈T. This 
rules out negative                                                              
       marginal productivity of  inputs. 
• Output is freely disposable. Hence, if (x0, y0)∈T and y1≤ y0, then (x0, y1)∈T 
 
Varian (1984) pointed out that the smallest set satisfying assumptions (1)-(4) is; 
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Then, for any ),(, yxxx ≥ is feasible. Finally, for any ),(, yxyy ≤ is also feasible.  
Technical efficiency of any firm producing  output y0 from input x0 is *1 ϕ , where   
  *ϕ = max .),(: 00 Syx ∈ϕϕ  
 
Note that this is an output-oriented measure of efficiency. Alternatively, one could use an 
input-oriented approach, where efficiency lies in conserving inputs while producing the 
observed output quantity. To compute output-oriented efficiency one solves the following 
linear programming problem:  
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This BCC model allows increasing, constant, or diminishing returns to scale along the 
frontier of the production possibility set at different levels of inputs. 
 
4. The Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 The Data 
 
 
Our study is based on firm-level data obtained from the CMIE database and covers the 
period, 1991-92 to 1998-99, coinciding with initial years of the post-reform era in India. 
We use a balanced panel of data over the entire period ((as in Majumdar (1998), except 
that our sample comprises both public and private firms)). While this leads to a sample 
that is smaller than the complete set of firms in a given year, it eliminates distortions in 
comparisons that could be created by the entry or exit of firms in parts of the total period.  
 
As explained before, we compare performance of public and private firms separately in 
eight different industrial sectors instead of lumping together firms in disparate industrial 
sectors. The eight sectors, based on the CMIE’s classification, are: chemicals, electronics, 
iron and steel, non-electrical machinery, minerals, textiles, service industry and transport.  
 
The CMIE’s classification is based on whether 50 per cent or more of a firm’s output 
falls within a given category. The CMIE’s classification does contain sub-categories for 
the industrial sectors we have chosen. However, we chose to carry out our analysis at the 
overall sectoral level as sub-categories do not produce sufficiently large balanced panels 
of private and public firms. The descriptive statistics for these firms are provided in table 
1. The sample size varies from 34 to 173.   
 
 
   
The output and input variables used in our study were constructed in the following way. 
For gross output, we use net sales of firms (that is sales net of excise duties) adjusted for 
changes in inventories. For inputs, we use: wages, raw materials, energy and capital. As 
energy and raw materials are included separately as inputs, the use of gross output, rather 
than net value added, is appropriate. (Net value added is used when the only inputs are 
labor and capital). All nominal values have been appropriately deflated. In the case of 
output, the deflator is the wholesale price index for the relevant industrial sector; for 
wages, it is the consumer price index for industrial workers; for energy, it is the 
wholesale price index for energy; for capital, it is the wholesale price index for 
equipment. Different raw material price indexes were constructed for individual industry 
codes. 
 
For capital, we do not use gross or fixed assets, unlike the studies cited here. Instead, we 
denote capital to mean the summation of four items: interest, depreciation, repairs and 
other rent. In other words, we prefer a measure for capital that is based on flows to one 
that is based on stock, as measures for output and other inputs are all based on flows. 
 
Further, we use wages instead of number of employees, as the database does not provide 
the latter. Wages, deflated by the price index, yield quantities of labor. 
 
 
4.2 Results   
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  for the sample firms
Sector No of firms Mean Output Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Chemical 173 163.42 258.43 1.40 1700.08
Electronics 61 181.06 332.36 1.03 1598.50
Steel 86 360.81 1474.58 1.23 12806.24
Mineral 34 2743.85 7387.35 3.33 39312.91
Non-electrical 96 153.58 489.50 0.54 4524.73
Service 102 382.06 977.33 0.49 5731.89
Textiles 141 118.43 150.92 1.01 966.33
Transport 91 282.53 755.57 2.17 5162.91
Note: All figures are eight year averages; financial figures are presented in 
Rupee millions (Rs47=$1)
We measure the output-oriented BCC model to compute VRS technical efficiency for 
each firm with reference to a frontier constructed from the input-output data of firms 
from the same industry in any one particular year. This is obtained for a pooled sample of 
public and private firms in a given industrial sector separately for each year, that is, 
relative to an efficient frontier for that year. We thus obtain the average technical 
efficiency for public and private firms for each of eight years. (The technical efficiency 
score for any given firm would range from 0 to 1.) These eight observations for public 
and private sectors are subjected to a t-test for difference in means. 
 
  
 
4.2.1 t-test for differences in average efficiency 
 
The technical efficiency results obtained for the public and private sectors in each of the 
eight industrial categories are presented in tables 2-9. 
 
     
 
 
Table 2: Technical efficiency   Table 3: Technical efficiency   
scores in chemical sector scores in electronics sector
Private Public Private Public 
1991-92 0.82 0.77 1991-92 0.84 0.87
1992-93 0.79 0.73 1992-93 0.82 0.88
1993-94 0.79 0.74 1993-94 0.84 0.90
1994-95 0.81 0.73 1994-95 0.85 0.91
1995-96 0.80 0.69 1995-96 0.84 0.91
1996-97 0.80 0.70 1996-97 0.81 0.91
1997-98 0.80 0.68 1997-98 0.82 0.87
1998-99 0.83 0.67 1998-99 0.80 0.74
Average 0.81 0.71 Average 0.83 0.87
Av 1992-95 0.80 0.74 Av 1992-95 0.84 0.89
Av 1996-99 0.81 0.68 Av 1996-99 0.82 0.86
Table 4: Technical efficiency   Table 5: Technical efficiency   
scores in steel sector scores in mineral sector
Private Public Private Public 
1991-92 0.91 0.87 1991-92 0.78 0.77
1992-93 0.90 0.85 1992-93 0.71 0.76
1993-94 0.86 0.79 1993-94 0.72 0.74
1994-95 0.92 0.86 1994-95 0.73 0.77
1995-96 0.91 0.83 1995-96 0.75 0.79
1996-97 0.85 0.75 1996-97 0.67 0.75
1997-98 0.89 0.78 1997-98 0.65 0.68
1998-99 0.86 0.79 1998-99 0.63 0.54
Average 0.89 0.81 Average 0.71 0.73
Av 1992-95 0.90 0.84 Av 1992-95 0.73 0.76
Av 1996-99 0.88 0.79 Av 1996-99 0.68 0.69
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Technical efficiency   Table 9: Technical efficiency   
scores in textile sector scores in transport sector
Private Public Private Public 
1991-92 0.88 0.89 1991-92 0.80 0.81
1992-93 0.87 0.76 1992-93 0.92 0.95
1993-94 0.84 0.70 1993-94 0.88 0.93
1994-95 0.86 0.67 1994-95 0.90 0.89
1995-96 0.85 0.73 1995-96 0.91 0.88
1996-97 0.84 0.69 1996-97 0.77 0.72
1997-98 0.84 0.57 1997-98 0.88 0.87
1998-99 0.82 0.58 1998-99 0.91 0.93
Average 0.85 0.70 Average 0.87 0.87
Av. 1992-95 0.86 0.76 Av. 1992-95 0.88 0.90
Av  1996-99 0.83 0.64 Av  1996-99 0.87 0.85
 
The averages for technical efficiency in each sector and the t-statistics for differences in 
means are summarized in table 10.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 reveals the following: 
 
• In three sectors- chemicals, iron and steel and textiles, the private sector’s technical 
efficiency scores are superior 
• In two sectors- electronics and services- the public sector’s scores are superior 
• In three sectors- minerals, non-electrical machinery and transport- there is no 
difference between the two sectors 
 
Table 6: Technical efficiency scores Table 7: Technical efficiency   
in non-electrical machinery sector scores in services sector
Private Public Private Public 
1991-92 0.84 0.84 1991-92 0.56 0.70
1992-93 0.43 0.36 1992-93 0.56 0.72
1993-94 0.68 0.61 1993-94 0.39 0.59
1994-95 0.53 0.42 1994-95 0.43 0.61
1995-96 0.71 0.64 1995-96 0.36 0.60
1996-97 0.83 0.79 1996-97 0.37 0.60
1997-98 0.82 0.81 1997-98 0.31 0.58
1998-99 0.72 0.69 1998-99 0.32 0.52
Average 0.70 0.64 Average 0.41 0.61
Av 1992-95 0.62 0.55 Av 1992-95 0.48 0.66
Av 1996-99 0.77 0.74 Av 1996-99 0.34 0.57
Table 10: Technical efficiency results 
 Private Public t-statistic
Chemicals 0.81 0.71 6.97a
 
Electronics 0.83 0.87 -2.2a
 
Steel 0.89 0.81 4.01a
 
Minerals 0.71 0.73 -0.59
 
Non-electrical 0.70 0.64 0.61
 
Service 0.41 0.61 -4.76a
 
Textile 0.85 0.70 4.12a
 
Transport 0.87 0.87 -0.04
 
Note: Technical efficiency scores are averages over the period 
1991-92 to 1998-99; significant values are bold faced; subscript a   
significance at 5 per cent level of confidence
 
Thus, out of eight sectors, only in three does the private sector exhibit superior technical 
efficiency. This would seem to refute the notion, commonly expressed in the popular 
press in India, that the public sector tends to uniformly under-perform the private sector.  
 
We have separately computed technical efficiency averages for the first four years and 
the last four years of the period under study. We note the following: 
 
• In five sectors- electronics, steel, minerals, services and textiles- the average for the 
last four years is lower than in the first four 
• In two sectors- chemicals and transport- it is almost the same for the private sector 
and lower for the public sector 
• Only in one sector- non-electrical machinery- do we find that technical efficiency is 
higher in the second half of the period covered 
 
The above findings are of interest because they appear to be consistent with the general 
deceleration in growth in industry in the later years of economic reforms, a matter that 
has been the subject of much comment in the media and among policy-making circles in 
India.  
 
 
   4.2.2 Comparing performance after controlling for scale and time 
  
It is often contended that if at all some public sector firms in India do better than their 
private sector counterparts it is only because they have the advantages of size. In other 
words, private sector performance would be superior to that of the public sector once we 
adjust for scale effects. This would imply that, while public sector firms in some 
industries might be doing better than the private sector, if the same firms were to be 
handed over to private ownership, the performance of these firms would be even better. 
 
We examine whether these propositions about the advantages of size in the public sector 
are correct. We do by using a Tobit model with technical efficiency as the dependent 
variable and scale and time as independent variables, with dummy variables for 
ownership, industry and industry interacted with ownership.   
 
The specified Tobit model is  
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where  
it
jy = output of firm i in  industry j in the year t 
Dj = 1 if firm is from industry j (industry code 1 is the reference) 
Pub = 1 if firm is a PSU 
       = 0 if firm is in the private sector 
Tt = 1 if observation is from year t (year 1992 is the reference). 
 
 
We initially ran the model for all eight industries. As reported in Table 11, the coefficient 
of ownership in industry code 1, γ, turned out to be insignificant. So did ρj, the coefficient 
of the industry interacted with ownership variable, in the case of four industries. We then 
ran the model after omitting the ownership variable Pub and also the industries in which 
ρj was insignificant and then examined what the effects of ownership were in the 
remaining four industries. 
 
 
 
 
 
                 Table 11. Tobit Regression Estimates 
 
  Standard Chi-  
Parameter Estimate Error Square Pr > ChiSq
     
Intercept -0.3129 0.0247 160.56 <.0001
     
d2ind (δ2) -0.0064 0.0198 0.1 0.7474
d3ind (δ3) -1.0359 0.0224 2142.12 <.0001
d4ind (δ4) -0.2984 0.0219 186.35 <.0001
d5ind (δ5) -0.1602 0.0426 14.13 0.0002
d6ind (δ6) 0.0162 0.0223 0.53 0.467
d7ind (δ7) -0.1963 0.0245 64.03 <.0001
d8ind (δ8) -0.0609 0.0191 10.15 0.0014
dtype (γ) -0.0581 0.0542 1.15 0.2835
dt2ind(ρ2) -0.1551 0.0729 4.53 0.0334
dt3ind(ρ3) 0.2419 0.064 14.29 0.0002
dt4ind(ρ4) -0.0416 0.0776 0.29 0.5917
dt5ind(ρ5) -0.1272 0.0776 2.69 0.1012
dt6ind(ρ6) -0.1871 0.0926 4.08 0.0434
dt7ind(ρ7) 0.0262 0.0802 0.11 0.7437
dt8ind(ρ8) -0.1761 0.0684 6.64 0.01
ln(y)(β1) 0.0477 0.0083 32.88 <.0001
ln(y)2(β2) 0.0009 0.0012 0.53 0.4679
dyr93(τ93) -0.1163 0.0203 32.81 <.0001
dyr94(τ94) -0.142 0.0203 48.74 <.0001
dyr95(τ95) -0.1429 0.0204 49.32 <.0001
dyr96(τ96) -0.1145 0.0203 31.82 <.0001
dyr97(τ97) -0.1372 0.0203 45.7 <.0001
dyr98(τ98) -0.1512 0.0203 55.38 <.0001
dyr99(τ99) -0.1602 0.0203 62.43 <.0001
     
 
Selected coefficient estimates from the model after omitting the ownership variable, Pub, 
and the industries in which the ownership effects were insignificant are reported in table 
12. 
 
Table 12 (selected coefficients from the revised model) 
 
Industry/Output Coefficient ρj* Level of 
significance 
Chemical -0.2328 .0001 
Service  0.1865   .0001 
Steel -0.2098   .0043 
Minerals -0.3276   .0001 
ln (y)  0.0540    .0001 
*ρj is an estimate of the difference between public and private ownership within a given 
industry 
 
The output coefficient is significant which implies that technical efficiency increases with 
size. In three industries, chemical, steel, and minerals, private ownership is seen to be 
significantly superior when we have controlled for scale and time effects. In one industry, 
service, the public sector is seen to be significantly superior. In four industries, there are 
no differences. 
 
This means that, even after adjusting for scale, we do not find evidence of across-the-
board superiority in private sector performance. The score is 3-1 in favor of the private 
sector with a tie in four industries. This does undermine the proposition that public sector 
performance would be uniformly inferior to that of the private sector but for the 
advantages of scale that public sector firms enjoy. It also implies that we cannot hope to 
see improvements in performance in all industries through a transfer of ownership from 
government to the private sector. 
 
 
5. Discussion of results  
  
We have attempted in this paper to compare the performance of public and private sectors 
in the period since economic reforms, using DEA methods. We have examined measures 
of efficiency based on quantities of inputs and outputs used.  Our analysis covers 
balanced panels of private and public firms over the period 1991-92 to 1998-99 and 
includes eight industrial sectors, based on CMIE’s classification. 
 
Our findings would call into question the presumption of superior private performance 
that is common in policy debate in India today and that certainly underlies the clamor for 
privatization in the Indian context. It is worth noting that the private enterprises in our 
sample comprise both domestic and foreign firms, so the results cannot be ascribed to the 
quality of management at domestic private firms alone.  
 
Nor can the results be ascribed to absence of competition. It is true that, in the mineral 
sector, there are some sub-sectors, notably petroleum, where the public sector had a 
monopolistic presence for much of the period under review. But this is not true of the two 
other sectors where the performance of the public sector is not significantly lower, 
namely, non-electrical machinery and transport. Within the services sector, there have 
been some sub-sectors, such as telecommunications, where there have been public sector 
monopolies for a portion of the period under review but these sub-sectors again have 
been exposed to competition in recent years. 
  
While not central to our objective, our findings lend support to the perception, reflected 
in the media, that the gains of economic reforms in terms of accelerated growth and 
higher productivity have tended to taper off in the second half of the nineties. 
 
We also do not find private sector performance to be uniformly superior when we have 
controlled for scale effects- such superiority is manifest only in three industries This 
would imply that in five out of eight industries, handing over public sector firms to 
private ownership will not make for any significant improvement in technical efficiency. 
 
Our results could have important implications for privatization policy. It could be 
plausibly argued that, to start with, the cause of lifting overall economic performance 
would be better served by focusing on industrial sectors in which the private sector has 
done better or in which it could do better, given the advantages of scale that public sector 
firms enjoy. It is public sector firms in these industries that should be the focus of 
privatization efforts.  
 
The government has withdrawn or curtailed budgetary support to several firms in the 
years consequent to economic reform. Nor has it allowed many of these firms to raise 
capital on their own. Budgetary constraints apart, an oft- cited argument is that providing 
capital to public sector firms is “money down the drain”. This argument is hard to sustain 
in cases where the public sector is seen to do as well as or better than the private sector  
 
Given that the private sector has not demonstrated clear superiority in performance, it 
may be appropriate to address underlying structural factors, such as poor governance, 
weak law enforcement and tardy bankruptcy procedures that tend to keep the private 
sector from realizing its fullest potential. 
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